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The Louisiana DOMA as an Improper Impediment to 
the Evolution of Public Policy Toward Cohabitants 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some people just do not want to get married. In fact, more and 
more Americans are choosing not to do so, opting instead to live 
together without walking down the aisle.
1
 As of the 2000 Census, 
there were nearly 5.5 million households in the United States headed 
by an unmarried partner.
2
 Of those households, more than 4.8 
million were headed by an opposite-sex unmarried partner.
3
  
Social acceptance of unmarried couples in long-term 
relationships has increased in the last 20 years.
4
 Public attitudes 
toward celebrity lifestyles are often indicative of a broader approval 
or disapproval of the lifestyle in general. Some famous couples have 
chosen not to marry yet have remained devoted to one another for 
decades and raised families together. Kurt Russell and Goldie 
Hawn, for instance, are both successful actors who have been 
together for more than 25 years without getting married.
5
 The two 
have a son, along with other children from previous marriages.
6
 
When asked why she and Russell never married, Hawn replied, 
“Because we have done just perfectly without marrying . . . . I 
already feel devoted and isn’t that what marriage is supposed to do? 
So as long as my emotional state is in a state of devotion, honesty, 
caring and loving, then we’re fine.”7 Although there is some debate 
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 1. T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 
55, 59 (2004) (citing Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Cohabitation, 
Marriage and Union Stability: Preliminary Findings from NSFH2 at tbl. 2 (Nat’l 
Survey of Families and Households, Working Paper No. 65, May 1995)). 
 2. TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
MARRIED COUPLE AND UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, CENSUS 2000 
SPECIAL REPORT 4 tbl. 2 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Gallanis, supra note 1, at 58. 
 5. Goldie Hawn and Kurt Russell prove their 25-year romance is still going 
strong on holiday in Croatia, THE DAILY MAIL ONLINE, (June 17, 2010, 8:22 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1287435/Goldie-Hawn-Kurt-Rus 
sell-prove-25-year-romance-going-strong-holiday-Croatia.html#ixzz11huplXgn. 
 6. See Goldie Hawn Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography. 
com/articles/Goldie-Hawn-9331873 (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). 
 7. Anythinghollywood, Hollywood’s Golden Couple, Goldie Hawn and Kurt 
Russell, ZIMBIO.COM (Mar. 8, 2009, 4:33 AM), http://www.zimbio.com/Goldie+ 
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about whether living together outside of marriage is an acceptable 
social practice, such relationships have undeniably become more 
common. As Letitia Baldridge noted over 30 years ago, “It used to 
be called living in sin . . . but it has become, by weight of sheer 
statistics, a way of life. We must therefore cope with it as such.”8 
Americans choose not to marry for various reasons. The 
American Law Institute articulated a few such reasons in its 
“Principles of the Law on Family Dissolution”: 
Among other [reasons], some [couples] have been unhappy 
in prior marriages and therefore wish to avoid the form of 
marriage even as they enjoy its substance. . . .  Some begin a 
casual relationship that develops slowly into a durable union, 
by which time a formal marriage ceremony may seem 
awkward . . . . Failure to marry may reflect group mores; 
some ethnic and social groups have a substantially lower 
incidence of marriage and a substantially higher incidence of 
informal domestic relationships than do others. Failure to 
marry may also reflect strong social or economic inequality 
between the partners, which allows the stronger partner to 
resist the weaker partner’s preference for marriage. . . . In all 
these cases, the absence of formal marriage may have little 
or no bearing on the character of the parties’ domestic 
relationship . . . .
9
 
No matter what reason a couple chooses not to marry, society 
now recognizes such relationships and the law should do so as well. 
Scholars have long debated the legal rights and protections that 
should be afforded to couples choosing not to enter into the marital 
relationship.
10
 Any rights and protections that exist for such couples, 
which vary from state to state, were threatened in the aftermath of 
                                                                                                             
 
Hawn/articles/69/Hollywood+Golden+Couple+Goldie+Hawn+Kurt+Russell (last 
visited February 22, 2012). 
 8. THE AMY VANDERBILT COMPLETE BOOK OF ETIQUETTE 128 (L. 
Baldridge ed., 1978). 
 9. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 6.02 cmt. a (2002). 
 10. See generally Gallanis, supra note 1, at 59; Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, 
Concubinage and its Alternatives: A Proposal for a More Perfect Union, 26 LOY. 
L. REV. 1 (1980). 
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the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health.
11
 In Goodridge, the court held that 
denying a same-sex couple’s right to marriage violated the 
Massachusetts Constitution.
12
 In response, 30 states have adopted a 
“Defense of Marriage Amendment” (“DOMA”) to amend their 
constitutions and prevent a similar decision granting same-sex 
couples the right to marry.
13
  
Many of these DOMAs also affect the rights of opposite-sex 
couples. Fifteen DOMAs, including Louisiana’s, prohibit a legal 
status “identical or substantially similar” to marriage for all 
unmarried persons, including opposite-sex couples as well as same-
sex partners.
14
 In several of these states, legal authorities analyzed 
the amendment and determined its effect upon unmarried opposite-
sex couples (“cohabitants”).15 Although in 2004 the Louisiana 
legislature debated the effect its DOMA would have, the issue 
remains unresolved.
16
  
Compounding the uncertainty as to the application of DOMA to 
cohabitants in Louisiana is the State’s history of legislative 
                                                                                                             
 11. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; ARK. 
CONST. amend. 83, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; CO. CONST. art. 2, § 31; FLA. 
CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, ¶ I; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; IDAHO 
CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. 
art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. 
CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. 
CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. 
CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH 
CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. 
 14. These fifteen DOMAs are those of: Arkansas, ARK. CONST. art. I, § 25; 
Florida, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; Kansas, KAN CONST. art. XV, § 16; Kentucky, 
KY. CONST. § 233A; Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; Michigan, MICH. 
CONST. art. I, § 25; North Dakota, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; Ohio, OHIO CONST. 
art. XV, § 11; Oklahoma, OK. CONST. art. II, § 35; South Carolina, S.C. CONST. 
art. XVIII, § 15; South Dakota, S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; Texas, TEX. CONST. art. 
I, § 32; Utah, UTAH. CONST. art. I, § 29; Virginia, VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; 
Wisconsin, WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. 
 15. See National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Gov. of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 
(Mich. 2008); Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App. 2006); Va. Att’y 
Gen. Op. No. 006-003, 2006 WL 4286442 (2006); Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2007-
29, 2007 WL 2689931 (2007); Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2005-7171, 2005 WL 
639112 (2005). 
 16. The Louisiana DOMA was passed on September 18, 2004 as Act number 
926. 2004 La. Acts 2878. 
792 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
restrictions upon private contracts between such couples.
17
 Those 
contractual restrictions were repealed over 20 years ago, revealing a 
movement toward a more liberal public policy concerning the rights 
of cohabitants, consistent with changing social attitudes about such 
relationships.
18
 The Louisiana DOMA, adopted primarily in an 
effort to strengthen the ban on same-sex marriage in the state, 
impedes this movement with a blanket restriction on the contractual 
rights of cohabitants. Consequently, legal experts are questioning 
the direction of the state’s current policy toward cohabitants.19 This 
Comment answers those questions and others by providing much-
needed clarity concerning the scope of the Louisiana DOMA. 
This Comment will proceed in four parts. Part I profiles state 
DOMAs nationwide and offers a glimpse of several states’ 
determinations of the effect of those laws on the rights of 
cohabitants. Part II discusses the liberalization of the public policy 
toward cohabitants in Louisiana. Part III shows how the Louisiana 
DOMA is an improper impediment to the development of this 
policy. Part IV concludes with a recommendation that the legislature 
change the Louisiana DOMA to address only same-sex marriage. 
This change is necessary because the Louisiana DOMA’s 
restrictions are inconsistent with the direction of state public policy, 
ineffective as a tool to promote marriage, and, as part of the state 
constitution, far too burdensome to change in order to maintain 
consistency with contemporary social norms. 
I. THE FIGHT FOR ANSWERS ACROSS THE COUNTRY: DETERMINING 
THE EFFECT OF STATE DOMAS UPON COHABITANTS 
Called to action by state supreme courts that viewed legislative 
bans of same-sex marriage as violative of their state constitutions, 
many state legislatures adopted constitutional amendments declaring 
same-sex marriage unconstitutional.
20
 Although the amendments 
were created to prevent a state supreme court from granting same-
sex couples the right to marry, many of the amendments also 
                                                                                                             
 17. KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, § 
8.3 in 15 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 771 (3d ed. 2010). 
 18. See generally Catherine Augusta Mills, Comment, Implications of the 
Repeal of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481, 48 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1215 (1988). 
 19. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 17, at 771. 
 20. See supra note 13. 
2012] COMMENT 793 
 
 
 
address the rights of opposite-sex couples. In many of these states, 
the public grew concerned over whether the language of these 
amendments could potentially affect private contracts.  
A. State Supreme Court Decisions Nullifying Legislative 
Prohibitions of Same-Sex Marriage 
Most states prevent same-sex couples from contracting to 
marry.
21
 For example, Louisiana’s legislative protections of 
marriage are found in the Civil Code. Louisiana Civil Code article 
86 defines marriage as “a legal relationship between a man and a 
woman that is created by civil contract.”22 The first part of article 89 
prohibits persons of the same sex from contracting marriage with 
each other.
23
 The second part of that article implements article 3520 
to govern same-sex marriages contracted in other states:
24
 “A 
purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a 
strong public policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage 
contracted in another state shall not be recognized in this state for 
any purpose . . .”25 Any marriage contracted in violation of an 
impediment, such as the impediment of same sex, is considered 
absolutely null under Louisiana law, voiding any legal effect of the 
marriage from the moment of its creation.
26
 Furthermore, “a 
purported marriage between parties of the same sex does not 
produce any civil effects.”27  
                                                                                                             
 21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (Westlaw 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
741.212 (Westlaw 2011); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (Westlaw 2011); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 517.01 (Westlaw 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (West 2007); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (Westlaw 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (Westlaw 
2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 3.1 (Westlaw 2011); TEX FAM. CODE ANN. § 
6.204 (West 2006). 
 22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 86 (2010). 
 23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2010). 
 24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2010) (“Persons of the same sex may not contract 
marriage with each other. A purported marriage between persons of the same sex 
contracted in another state shall be governed by the provisions of Title II of Book 
IV of the Civil Code.”). 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3520 (2010). 
 26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 94 (2010) (“A marriage is absolutely null when 
contracted without a marriage ceremony, by procuration, or in violation of an 
impediment . . . .”); id. cmt. b. 
 27. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 96 (2010). The article allows for civil effects to 
remain in the following situations: a) “in favor of a party who contracted for the 
marriage in good faith for as long as that party remain in good faith;” b) “[w]hen 
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State courts, however, found that these kinds of limitations on 
same-sex marriage violated state constitutions.
28
 In 1993, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court held in Baehr v. Lewin that there was no 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage in Hawaii, but that a claim 
for sex discrimination arising out of the denial of marriage rights 
was subject to strict scrutiny.
29
 The court remanded the case, and in 
1996, the Hawaii Supreme Court held the state had not met its 
burden of showing a compelling interest for the discrimination and 
therefore found that the Hawaii statute limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples violated the Hawaii Constitution.
30
  
Similarly, in 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held in Baker v. 
State that the Vermont Constitution required the benefits of 
marriage be extended to same-sex couples.
31
 In that case, same-sex 
couples claimed the legislation that denied them marriage licenses 
violated the state constitution.
32
 The court allowed the existing 
legislation to remain in effect while the legislature drafted new laws 
in accordance with the order.
33
 In response to the court’s ruling, the 
Vermont Legislature created a new legal relationship—the civil 
union for same-sex partners, carrying with it all the legal incidents 
and benefits of marriage.
34
 Commentators on both ends of the 
marriage debate described the unions as “‘same-sex marriage by 
another name,’ or ‘marriage lite’ . . . .”35 Thus, they argued that “the 
                                                                                                             
 
the cause of the nullity is one party’s prior undissolved marriage, the civil effects 
continue in favor of the other party, regardless of whether the [other party] 
remains in good faith, until the marriage is pronounced null or the latter party 
contracts a valid marriage;” and c) “a marriage contracted by a party in good faith 
produces civil effects in favor of a child of the parties.” 
 28. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 
1993). 
 29. Baehr, 852 P.2d 44. 
 30. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), aff’d, Baehr v. Miike, 950 
P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). In 1998, Hawaii passed a constitutional amendment, 
article I § 23, granting the legislature the right to reserve marriage for opposite-sex 
couples.  
 31. Baker, 744 A.2d 864. 
 32. Id. at 867–68. 
 33. Id. at 887. 
 34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (Westlaw 2011). 
 35. Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive 
Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 221, 229 (2004–2005). 
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[Vermont legislature] maintained a nominal distinction between 
civil unions and marriage.”36 
Four years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court went a step 
further than Baker in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.
37
 
Partially relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas,
38
 and expanding on the decision of the Vermont Supreme 
Court in Baker, the court re-wrote the Massachusetts definition of 
marriage as “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the 
exclusion of all others.”39 The court later issued an opinion to the 
state senate which said that drafting a statute establishing civil 
unions similar to those in Vermont while still denying marriage 
rights to same-sex couples would “maintain[] an unconstitutional, 
inferior and discriminatory status for same-sex couples.”40  
Many state legislatures became wary of cases like Goodridge 
and Baker and took measures to prevent such decisions from 
occurring in their respective states. To combat what they feared 
would be a growing trend in state courts, the legislatures proposed 
amendments to their state constitutions that would ban same-sex 
marriage. The general electorate subsequently adopted these 
amendments. 
B. State DOMAs Make Same-Sex Marriage Unconstitutional 
In 2000, Nebraska spearheaded the movement against the 
judicial expansion of marriage rights by becoming the first state to 
amend its constitution to recognize marriage as the union of only 
one man and one woman.
41
 The amendment also went beyond 
marriage, declaring invalid “[t]he uniting of two persons of the same 
sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex 
relationship.”42 Supporters of the amendment called it “a response to 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. 
 37. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 38. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 39. Richard Cook, Kansas’s Defense of Marriage Amendment: The 
Problematic Consequences of a Blanket Nonrecognition Rule on Kansas Law, 54 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (2006) (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d. at 969). 
 40. Jason Montgomery, An Examination of Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Ramifications of Lawrence v. Texas, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 687, 696 (2005) 
(citing Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1206–07 (2004)). 
 41. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (Westlaw 2011). 
 42. Id. 
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a court decision last year in Vermont [Baker] that stopped short of 
legalizing gay marriage but held that gay couples were entitled to 
the same benefits as heterosexual ones.”43 Opponents attacked the 
amendment on many grounds, including the potential for 
unintended, even harmful, restrictions on certain private agreements 
between same-sex couples.
44
 Having withstood a constitutional 
challenge that proceeded all the way to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the amendment still stands today.
45
  
Other states were hesitant to follow Nebraska’s response to 
Baker,
46
 but they quickly reacted to the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court’s official recognition of same-sex marriage rights in 
Goodridge.
47
 To date, 30 states have amended their constitutions to 
prohibit same-sex marriage.
48
 Twenty-three of these amendments 
were passed in the election cycle immediately following the 
Goodridge decision, and three more were passed in 2008.
49
  
Some of these states found it necessary not only to prohibit 
same-sex marriage but also to preclude any couple from creating a 
legal relationship with each other intended to replicate marriage. 
Fifteen state DOMAs, including Louisiana’s, not only prohibit 
same-sex marriage, but also limit the rights of cohabitants.
50
 
                                                                                                             
 43. Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay Unions, 
N.Y. TIMES, October 21, 2000, at A9. In her article, Belluck quotes Dan Parsons, 
the spokesman for the Nebraska Coalition for the Protection of Marriage, as 
saying, “Because of the action in Vermont, we really feel we’ve been forced to 
adopt this language to close this loophole.” Id. 
 44. Id. M.J. McBride, a campaign coordinator for Nebraskans Against 416, 
said, “My binding contracts, my power of attorney, wills and medical directives 
will be viewed as contracts or partnerships between two people of the same sex 
and no longer be recognized or valid in the state of Nebraska.” Id. 
 45. Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 
2005), rev’d, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 46. Only Nevada joined Nebraska in passing a constitutional amendment 
prior to Goodridge. Proposed in 2000, Article I, section 21 of the Nevada 
Constitution passed in 2002 because of a state law requiring voters to approve the 
amendment in two consecutive general elections. The amendment reads, “Only a 
marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect 
in this state.” NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 (Westlaw 2011). 
 47. Because Goodridge recognized same-sex couples’ right to marriage, and 
not their right to a marriage alternative like Baker, states were quicker to respond 
to what they perceived to be a direct attack on the institution of marriage itself. 
 48. See supra note 13 (listing state DOMAs). 
 49. In 2004, 13 amendments were passed. In 2005, two were passed. In 2006, 
eight were passed. 
 50. See supra note 15 (lisiting state DOMAs that address opposite sex 
couples). 
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Although the bulk of the national debate surrounding state DOMAs 
has focused on the ban of same-sex marriage, the language of this 
particular group of DOMAs raises important questions regarding the 
rights of cohabitants. A lack of clarity arises, specifically, through 
“legal status” clauses such as the Louisiana DOMA clause, which 
states, “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized.”51 In several of these states, state courts or attorneys 
general have been compelled to offer analyses of whether the state 
DOMAs affect private contracts. 
C. Determining the Effects of State DOMAs 
Each of the states to address the effect of the state DOMA on the 
rights of cohabitants has come to a similar result. However, the 
opinions from the state courts and attorneys general vary as to both 
the reasoning and directness.  
1. Clear Interpretations of the State DOMA 
Virginia, Kansas, and Texas have provided a clear and direct 
analysis of their state DOMA through opinions from state courts or 
attorneys general.
52
 All such opinions held that the effects of the 
state DOMA were limited to state action. 
a. Virginia’s Clear-Cut Decision: There is No Effect 
The Virginia DOMA prohibits the creation of a legal status with 
effects similar to marriage regardless of any romantic relationship 
between the parties. The amendment says, in pertinent part, 
“[Virginia] and its political subdivisions shall not create or 
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals 
that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or 
effects of marriage.”53 Prior to the passage of the amendment, the 
Virginia Attorney General issued an opinion stating, without 
                                                                                                             
 51. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (Supp. 2011). 
 52. See Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App. 14th Dis. 2006); Va. 
Att’y Gen. Op. No. 06-003, 2006 WL 4286442 (2006); Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. 2007-
29, 2007 WL 2689931 (2007). 
 53. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (Westlaw 2011). 
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equivocation, that the amendment would not affect private 
contracts.
54
 In particular, the opinion states that the amendment 
would not affect the legal rights of unmarried persons involving 
various types of private contracts and agreements. Nor would it 
“alter any other rights that do not ‘approximate the design, qualities, 
significance, or effects of marriage’” or create the rights or effects of 
marriage.
55
 The attorney general noted further that these rights do 
not arise from marriage and are therefore unaffected by the 
enactment of the marriage amendment.
56
 The attorney general then 
issued a sweeping statement designed to inspire certainty regarding 
the private contractual rights of persons in Virginia following the 
passage of the marriage amendment: “Any Virginian, subject to any 
other existing legal limitations, may enter into any lawful contract, 
dispose of property to any person of his choosing by will or deed, or 
appoint any person to act on his behalf pursuant to a power of 
attorney or advance medical directive.”57 Following the attorney 
general’s clear and strong opinion, no litigation or other legal 
challenges concerning the Virginia DOMA have arisen. 
b. Kansas Relies on Legislative Intent to Declare No Effect 
The relevant part of the Kansas DOMA, subsection (b), reads as 
follows: “No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized 
by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of 
marriage.”58 Although the amendment does not employ language 
referring specifically to legal status, the Kansas Attorney General 
was asked to address whether the amendment affected private 
insurance contracts.
59
 In his opinion, the Kansas Attorney General 
looked to the legislature’s intent when it drafted the amendment and 
determined there was no such effect.
60
 State Representative Jan 
Pauls said private employers could voluntarily offer insurance 
benefits to “non-marital couples.”61 Representative Pauls also 
                                                                                                             
 54. Va. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 06-003, 2006 WL 4286442. 
 55. Id. at 1. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. Id. at 3. 
 58. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (Westlaw 2011). 
 59. Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2007-29, 2007 WL 2689931 (2007). 
 60. Id. at 2. 
 61. Id. 
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insisted the amendment would not “remove any rights that a Kansas 
citizen currently holds.”62 The attorney general’s opinion also 
includes the testimony of Professor Kris Kobach,
63
 who said that 
subsection (b) of the amendment applied only to rights and incidents 
of marriage given by the state and did not limit contractual or legal 
agreements between private parties.
64
 Professor Kobach then 
explained his view in further detail: 
In other words, private contracts that offer benefits similar to 
those offered to married couples are in no way prohibited by 
[the Marriage Amendment]. . . . When such a private 
contract is made, it does not constitute “recognition by the 
state.” The state has not acted in any way. [A] right or 
incident of marriage is something that is automatically 
triggered when a marriage exists. It is something that has 
been positively identified by statute or court decision . . . 
contractual or private legal arrangements are not “rights or 
incidents of marriage,” because they do not come into 
existence automatically under state law as soon as a 
marriage exists.
65
 
c. Texas Court’s Alternative Approach 
The Texas DOMA reads in relevant part, “This state or a 
political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any 
legal status identical or similar to marriage.”66 In Ross v. Goldstein, 
a Texas appellate court addressed an issue arising out of the intestate 
succession of John David Green.
67
 The court rejected a claim by 
Ross, Green’s same-sex partner, for recognition of a “marriage-like 
relationship” between the two men that would entitle Ross to a 
portion of Green’s property in the succession.68 The court reasoned 
that Texas’s DOMA mandated a denial of the claim because public 
policy was “unambiguous, clear, and controlling on the question of 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. (It is only logical to assume that when Rep. Pauls refers to “any right,” 
she is including the freedom to privately contract and order one’s affairs.). 
 63. Prof. Kris Kobach is the Daniel L. Brenner/UMKC Scholar and Professor 
of Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. He has taught at 
UMKC since 1996. 
 64. Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2007-29, 2007 WL 2689931, 3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (Westlaw 2011). 
 67. Ross v. Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 68. Id. at 514. 
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creating a new equitable remedy akin to marriage: [a court] may not 
create such a remedy.”69 The court stated further, “Texas has 
determined that same-sex couples must address their particular 
desires through other legal vehicles such as contracts or 
testamentary transfers.”70 Through this statement, the court thus 
recognized a freedom for private parties to contractually arrange 
their affairs. 
The court’s less-direct analysis has more to do with the issue 
brought before it than its interpretation of the amendment. Because 
the appellant argued only the issue of whether the court could 
establish a “marriage-like relationship” for same-sex couples,71 the 
court addressed only this issue. The court was not required to give 
the type of clear and definite statement given in both Kansas and 
Virginia as to the precise limits of the state DOMA. Although the 
court in Ross did not expressly address any potential effects on 
private contracts, it assumes there are none through its determination 
that same-sex couples can always address their concerns through 
private contracts.
72
 If same-sex couples in Texas can turn to 
contracts instead of a “marriage-like relationship” to order their 
affairs, it follows that opposite-sex couples can do the same. 
d. Michigan’s Application of General Constitutional Principles 
Unlike Virginia, Kansas, and Texas, legal authorities in 
Michigan used general principles of the Michigan Constitution, 
rather than a specific interpretation of the state DOMA itself, to find 
that Michigan’s DOMA did not affect private contracts. 
The Michigan DOMA reads in pertinent part, “[T]he union of 
one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. The court parenthetically refers to a Texas House of Representatives 
Joint Resolution, which says:  
This state recognizes that through the designation of guardians, the 
appointment of agents, and the use of private contracts, persons may 
adequately and properly appoint guardians and arrange rights relating to 
hospital visitation, property, and the entitlement to proceeds of life 
insurance policies without the existence of any legal status identical or 
similar to marriage. 
Id. (quoting Tex. H.R.J. Res. 6, § 2, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005)). 
 71. Ross, 203 S.W.3d at 512. 
 72. Id. at 514. 
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recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”73 This 
amendment uses the broadest language of all in prohibiting 
relationships similar to marriage under law.
74
 The amendment lacks 
any reference to same-sex or opposite-sex couples and bans any 
recognition of a marriage-like relationship “for any purpose.”75 
In National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, the 
Michigan Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the state 
DOMA prevented public employers from providing their employees 
with health insurance benefits for their domestic partners.
76
 The 
court held public employers could not provide such benefits since 
domestic partnerships were similar to marriage “because [they] are 
the only relationships in Michigan defined in terms of both gender 
and lack of a close blood connection.”77 Because public employers 
were an arm of the state and domestic partnerships were a 
relationship similar to marriage, the court concluded that the 
recognition of such benefits, and therefore the domestic partnership 
status, violated Michigan’s DOMA.78 In a footnote, the court 
specifically declined to address “whether private employers can 
provide health-insurance benefits to their employees’ same-sex 
domestic partners.”79 
Twenty years prior to National Pride, the court in Woodland v. 
Michigan Citizens Lobby provided a clear interpretation of the 
Michigan Constitution–specifically whether the relevant provisions 
applied to private conduct.
80
 In Woodland, the court held that the 
Declaration of Rights of the Michigan Constitution
81
 had “never 
been interpreted as extending to purely private conduct; these 
provisions have consistently been interpreted as limited to protection 
against state action.”82 In a 2005 interpretation of the state’s DOMA, 
the Michigan Attorney General used the court’s opinion in 
                                                                                                             
 73. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (Westlaw 2011). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008). 
 77. Id. at 536. Note that in this case, domestic partnerships only involved 
persons of the same gender. Id. at 531. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 544 n.1. 
 80. 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985). 
 81. The Declaration of Rights is Article I of the Michigan Constitution and 
contains the Michigan DOMA at section 25. 
 82. Woodland, 378 N.W.2d  at 344. 
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Woodland to find that the amendment operates “as a limitation on 
government conduct and therefore applies to state and local 
government entities.”83 
Unlike Texas, Kansas, and Virginia, the interpretations of the 
Michigan DOMA do not expressly address the amendments 
application to private contracts. Rather, through a clear 
interpretation of the general principles of the Michigan Constitution, 
one can infer that the amendment would not apply to any private 
conduct whatsoever. 
The aforementioned state interpretations of DOMAs around the 
nation show that state DOMAs are strong indicia of state policy 
toward the rights of cohabitants. Based on a variety of reasons, each 
interpretation found the state DOMA does not affect private 
contracts. The legal history of Louisiana provides a different 
scenario from the above mentioned states, and interpretation of the 
Louisiana DOMA could therefore be decidedly different. 
D. Shifting the Focus Back Home: The Adoption of the Louisiana 
DOMA 
Legal authorities in Louisiana face an issue that none of the 
aforementioned states had to resolve when deciphering the intent of 
the drafters of the state DOMA and determining the law’s effects: 
Louisiana’s history of legislative restrictions upon contracts between 
cohabitants. The Louisiana DOMA, adopted in September 2004, 
states: 
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the 
union of one man and one woman. No official or court of the 
state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state 
law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be 
conferred upon any member of a union other than the union 
of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or 
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
individuals shall not be valid or recognized. No official or 
court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage 
                                                                                                             
 83. Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 005-7171, 2005 WL 639112, 4 (2005). 
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contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of 
one man and one woman.
84
 
Prior to its passage, the state legislature debated several key 
issues arising from the language of the amendment.
85
 One major 
area of controversy was the proposed amendment’s potential impact 
on private contracts, including domestic agreements between 
cohabitants and domestic partner benefits private companies offer in 
contracts with their employees.
86
 Legal analysts were split on the 
potential impact of the amendment on these contracts.
87
 Specifically, 
the opposing sides disagreed as to what effect, if any, the Louisiana 
DOMA would have upon private contracts between cohabitants.
88
 
As the Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana noted in 
materials disseminated to voters in advance of the DOMA vote,  
Some legal scholars believe the amendment will not disturb 
private contracts . . . . Other legal experts think private 
contracts closely paralleling marital rights may be nullified 
such as alimony and health-care benefits. Others think the 
amendment would invalidate all agreements between same-
sex and unmarried opposite-sex partners, even those that are 
not marital in nature, such as medical directives.
89
 
Although Louisiana courts came close to resolving the dispute 
among the legislators, no answer has been provided yet, and the 
issue remains unresolved.
90
 
                                                                                                             
 84. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (emphasis added). 
 85. Guide to the Constitutional Amendment on the Defense of Marriage Act, 
STUD. & REP. BY DATE (Pub. Affairs Research Council of La.), Aug. 2004, at 3, 
available at http://www.la-par.org/studrepdate.cfm. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 4. The amendment also withstood a judicial challenge prior to its 
adoption in Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715 (La. 2005), on 
the grounds that it contained more than one object, violating the single-object rule 
of the Louisiana Constitution contained in Article XIII, section 1 (B). See Forum 
for Equality PAC, 893 So. 2d at 729, for an explanation of the single-object rule. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court eventually found that the DOMA had as its sole 
object “the defense and protection of our civil tradition of marriage.” Forum for 
Equality PAC, 893 So. 2d at 734.  
 90. After its adoption, the Louisiana DOMA was an issue in only one case, 
Ralph v. City of New Orleans, 4 So. 3d 146 (La. App. Ct. 4th 2009). The case 
involved a taxpayer suit seeking a declaration that the city of New Orleans and the 
City Council had acted beyond their powers when they provided for the registry of 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD COHABITANTS IN 
LOUISIANA 
Louisiana law governing the rights of cohabitants has undergone 
a gradual change coinciding with the contemporary cultural 
practices and attitudes of Louisiana citizens. The evolution of these 
laws is evident in the changes made to the Civil Code and the 
Revised Statutes. An examination of the changes to the Code 
articles and criminal statutes governing the rights of cohabitants 
exposes how the Louisiana DOMA undermines social policy. 
A. The Era of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481 and its Restrictions 
on the Rights of Cohabitants 
Only Louisiana and South Carolina have passed a statute 
restricting “donations between persons living in concubinage, or 
otherwise sustaining immoral relations.”91 The restrictions under the 
Louisiana Civil Code were much broader than those in South 
Carolina, limiting donations between anyone living in “open 
concubinage.”92 None of the versions of the Civil Code defined 
“open concubinage.” According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
concubinage can be defined as “the act or practice of cohabiting 
without legal marriage.”93 In other words, concubinage is a 
                                                                                                             
 
domestic partnerships, and then used the registry as the basis for extending health 
insurance coverage and benefits to the unmarried “domestic partners” of city 
employees. Ralph, 4 So. 3d at 148. One of the issues brought to the court rings a 
familiar tune—whether the health insurance benefits for domestic partners 
violated the Louisiana DOMA’s prohibition of “[a] legal status identical or 
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals . . . .” Id. at 158. 
The court, however, dismissed any consideration of this issue on procedural 
grounds, holding that the claim was not before it because it was not raised in the 
pleadings. Id. 
 91. Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Discountenancing 
Donations, Testamentary or Otherwise, Between Persons Living in Concubinage 
or Otherwise Sustaining Immoral Relations, 62 A.L.R. 286 (2010). The South 
Carolina statute, passed in the Act of 1795 and later incorporated into the general 
statutes, limited only a lawfully married man from giving more than one-fourth of 
the value of his estate to a woman with whom he lived in adultery. The statute is 
almost entirely obsolete, however, and has not been litigated since 1899. See 
Beaty v. Richardson, 34 S.E. 73 (S.C. 1899). 
 92. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1481 (1870). 
 93. Succession of Jahraus, 38 So. 417, 459 (La. 1905). 
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relatively stable relationship that requires living together as man and 
wife without being married.
94
 Concubinage is open when the 
relationship is not “disguised, concealed or made secret by the 
parties.”95 In Succession of Bacot, the court defined a concubine as 
“one who occupies the position, performs the duties, and assumes 
the responsibilities of a wife, without the title and privileges flowing 
from a legal marriage.”96 A paramour is simply a man with whom a 
concubine lives.
97
 
Prior to its repeal, Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481 provided 
the foundation for contractual restrictions upon those living in open 
concubinage in Louisiana.
98
 At first, the article completely 
prohibited donations of immovables and donations of movables in 
excess of certain pecuniary limitations.
99
  
The history and eventual repeal of article 1481 and its 
restrictions upon donations between persons living in open 
concubinage reveals a gradual change to a more liberal and open 
public policy toward cohabitants in Louisiana.
100
 During the Roman 
Empire, concubinage was widely recognized as an inferior or 
secondary status to marriage and was afforded only certain types of 
legal recognition.
101
 The Roman concubine never acquired the social 
or legal status of her male partner.
102
 Under early French law, 
concubines and paramours were completely prohibited from making 
                                                                                                             
 94. Lorio, supra note 10, at 13 (quoting Succession of Jahraus, 114 La. 456, 
458 (1905)). 
 95. Succession of Green v. Mears, 499 So. 2d 637, 638 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
1986). 
 96. 502 So. 2d 1118, 1127 (La. 1987) (quoting Purvis v. Purvis, 162 So. 2d 
239, 240 (La. Ct. App. 1935)). 
 97. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 323 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 98. The article was repealed by the Louisiana legislature in Act 468 of 1987. 
Act. No. 468, 1987 La. Acts 1149. 
 99. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1481 (1870): 
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively 
incapable of making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, 
any donation of immovables; and if they make a donation of movables, it 
can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate. 
Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule. 
 100. Mills, supra note 18, at 1215. 
 101. Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1127–28. 
 102. Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1128 (citing Lorio, supra note 10, at 5). 
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donations to each other.
103
 The versions of article 1481 in the early 
Louisiana Civil Codes also forbade all donations between those 
living in open concubinage, but in 1825 the article was amended to 
read as follows until it was repealed in 1987:
104
  
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are 
respectively incapable of making to each other, whether 
inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of immovables; 
and if they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed 
one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate. 
Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.
105
 
The jurisprudence that interpreted article 1481 reveals the 
evolution of Louisiana’s public policy toward cohabitants.106  
The first version of the article forbade all donations between 
concubine and paramour. In 1825 the article was modified to allow a 
donation of ten percent of one’s estate, and the legislature made an 
exception for couples that later married.
107
 The 1825 version of 
article 1481 lasted nearly 50 years, when the reasons for its 
application began to change.
108
 Originally, the article was used to 
discourage illicit liaisons, especially between white men and their 
slaves.
109
 Over time, article 1481 was used to condemn concubinage 
as immoral and to show that such relationships were unacceptable to 
society.
110
 As more people began living together outside of wedlock, 
article 1481 morphed into a vehicle to promote the institution of 
marriage and discourage concubinage.
111
 This is especially evident 
in light of the fact that, if two people living in open concubinage 
were to later marry one another, they would be completely exempt 
from any of the limitations of article 1481, both before and after 
marriage.
112
 However, one scholar pointed out that “penalizing 
                                                                                                             
 103. Lorio, supra note 10, at 12 n.61 (quoting the ancient French law which 
prohibited all donations between concubines in Royal Ordinance, Code Michaud 
de janvier 1629, art. 12). 
 104. Mills, supra note 18, at 1215. 
 105. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 1481 (1870). 
 106. Mills, supra note 18, at 1216. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. Mills offers an interesting perspective on the use of concubinage in the 
Civil War era to protect legitimate forced heirs from losing their inheritance rights 
to slaves and to prevent an increase in the free black population in the South. See 
Id. at 1216 n.78. 
 110. Id. at 1216. 
 111. Id. at 1216–17. 
 112. Lorio, supra note 10, at 20; see also Mills, supra note 18, at 1206. 
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those who [chose] concubinage over marriage [did] not significantly 
[promote] the latter institution at the expense of the former.”113 An 
examination of how article 1481 has applied to insurance policies 
provides a more in-depth view of the changes in the law over the last 
century. 
1. Article 1481 and Insurance Policies 
In 1905, the Louisiana Supreme Court in New York Life 
Insurance Co. v. Neal allowed a concubine, as a named beneficiary 
on a life insurance policy, to recover only one-tenth of the total 
proceeds of the policy.
114
 The court classified the proceeds of the 
policy as a donation of a movable subject to reduction under article 
1481.
115
 In 1930, the Supreme Court overruled Neal in Sizeler v. 
Sizeler and declared article 1481 inapplicable to life insurance 
proceeds, allowing the concubine to recover the whole amount of 
the proceeds.
116
 Although the Court in Sizeler found that life 
insurance policies were not governed by rules applicable to 
donations, such as article 1481, it also set a precedent for the 
supremacy of freedom of contract when it allowed a paramour living 
in open concubinage to enter into a particular type of contract for the 
benefit of the concubine.
117
  
More than 50 years later, in Woodmen of the World Life 
Insurance Society v. Leblanc, a Louisiana circuit court held a man 
could change the named beneficiary on his private life insurance 
policy from his wife and their two minor children to his 
concubine.
118
 The court held, “It was not for the trial judge then, nor 
is it for us now, to pass judgment on the decedent for his decision to 
change beneficiaries”.119 As one commenter noted, “With respect to 
Louisiana’s law on concubinage, this statement succinctly 
acknowledges the trend away from imposing upon individuals, 
through assertions of public policy, a sense of morality that is not 
shared by all.”120 
2. The Repeal of Article 1481 and its Implications 
                                                                                                             
 113. Lorio, supra note 10, at 23. 
 114. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 38 So. 485, 485 (La. 1905). 
 115. Id. at 486. 
 116. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 127 So. 388, 389 (La. 1930). 
 117. Mills, supra note 18, at 1207–08. 
 118. Mills, supra note 18, at 1208 (citing Woodmen of the World Life 
Insurance Society v. LeBlanc, 417 So. 2d 886 (La. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 119. Woodmen of the World, 417 So. 2d at 888. 
 120. Mills, supra note 18, at 1208. 
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The 1987 repeal of article 1481 marked the culmination of a 
gradual trend away from the imposition of a non-universal morality 
upon individuals living in open concubinage in Louisiana. The 
repeal also showed, at least prior to the passage of the Louisiana 
DOMA, that donations between cohabitants no longer violated 
public policy.  
When it repealed article 1481, the legislature also rejected a 
proposed article 101, which read as follows: “[a]n otherwise valid 
contract is not rendered unenforceable solely because the parties, 
neither of whom was married, were cohabitants at the time of 
contracting, but such a contract must be in writing.”121 This 
concurrent repeal and rejection are strong indicia of state policy 
towards cohabitants in the late 1980s.  
The repeal of 1481 indicated that donations between cohabitants 
were no longer against public policy.
122
 However, the rejection of 
article 101 shows the legislature was not ready to allow all contracts 
between cohabitants.
123
 These dual legislative acts show a desire to 
loosen the restrictions on the ability of cohabitants to privately 
contract with one another while concomitantly ensuring that such 
freedoms are not absolute. More importantly, the acts show how 
Louisiana law has evolved in tandem with societal norms; as the 
number of unwed cohabitants increased and social acceptance grew, 
the law changed to offer cohabitants greater freedom to order their 
affairs.  
3. Looking at What’s LeftThe Status of Concubinage Under 
Current Louisiana Law 
Since the repeal of article 1481, Louisiana law continues to 
recognize concubinage as a legal status. In the Louisiana Code of 
Evidence, a concubinage relationship is used as a prerequisite for 
certain exceptions to the inadmissibility of character evidence.
124
 
                                                                                                             
 121. H.B. 1139, § 1, art. 101, 1987 La. Reg. Sess. 
 122. Mills, supra  note 18, at 1228. 
 123. Id. As Mills notes in her comment, there is still room for those contracts 
that are otherwise enforceable so long as they do not violate public policy. Article 
1968 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares any contracts that violate public policy 
absolutely null for an unlawful cause. The article says, “The cause of an obligation 
is unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation would produce a result 
prohibited by law or against public policy.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1968. 
 124. LA. CODE EVIDENCE art. 404 (2009). Article 404 (A)(2) says: 
(2) Character of victim. (a) Except as provided in Article 412, evidence 
of a pertinent trait of character, such as a moral quality, of the victim of 
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
character evidence; provided that in the absence of evidence of a hostile 
demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the 
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Under Louisiana Revised Statute 9:344 (B), grandparents of a minor 
child can obtain visitation rights if the parent has died or is 
incarcerated and lived in concubinage with the other parent.
125
 Thus, 
while concubinage is not relevant to contractual freedom as it was 
during the era of article 1481, the legal status of concubinage still 
exists in modern Louisiana law.
126
 Concubinage (or cohabitation) 
was, at one time, evidence of a crime in Louisiana, as well. 
B. Cohabitation as Evidence of a Crime in Louisiana 
Unmarried cohabitants were once subject to criminal 
prosecution in Louisiana.
127
 From 1960 to 1975, entering into a 
common law marriage in Louisiana was a crime, punishable by a 
fine of up to $1,000, one-year imprisonment (with or without hard 
labor), or both.
128
 The statute outlawing common-law marriage 
provided: “The living together openly by a man and woman as man 
and wife shall be considered as prima facie evidence that a common 
law marriage has been entered into by them.”129 The statute was 
repealed in 1975 in Act No. 638 of the Louisiana Legislature. The 
purpose of that act clearly evinces legislative intent to maintain 
consistency with cultural norms. Its goal was to 
                                                                                                             
 
offense charged, evidence of his dangerous character is not admissible; 
provided further that when the accused pleads self-defense and there is a 
history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the accused and the 
accused lived in a familial or intimate relationship such as, but not 
limited to, the husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage relationship, it 
shall not be necessary to first show a hostile demonstration or overt act 
on the part of the victim in order to introduce evidence of the dangerous 
character of the victim, including specific instances of conduct and 
domestic violence; and further provided that an expert’s opinion as to the 
effects of the prior assaultive acts on the accused’s state of mind is 
admissible . . . .  
LA. CODE EVIDENCE art. 404(a)(2) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2009). 
 126. Following divorce, if a former spouse began living in open concubinage 
with another person, it was grounds for terminating alimony or reducing the 
amount of spousal support under former Louisiana Civil Code Article 112. That 
provision was repealed in 2006, but some former spouses are still alleging that 
living in open concubinage is grounds for terminating spousal support following 
the dissolution of a marriage. See e.g., Greenland v. Greenland, 29 So. 3d 647 (La. 
Ct. App. 2009); Ray v. Ray, 960 So. 2d 174 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 127. Mills, supra note 18, at 1213. 
 128. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79.1 (1961), enacted by Act No. 73, 
§ 1, 1960 La. Acts 240, 240–41, and repealed by Act No. 638, § 3, 1975 La. Acts 
1395). 
 129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79.1 (1961), repealed by Act No. 638, § 3, 
1975 La. Acts 1395. 
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provide that it is the public policy of the state of Louisiana to 
accord equal protection under the law of the state to all 
citizens without regard to race, creed, color, or national 
origin; to repeal laws inconsistent with this policy and to 
permit the gathering of statistics on such bases provided they 
are not used in contravention of this policy.
130
 
This repeal reflects the evolution that began in 1930 with the life 
insurance cases toward a more liberal public policy with respect to 
cohabitants in Louisiana.
131
 As the repealing act shows, the 
“religious overtones inherent in previous public policy were giving 
way to more important concerns.”132  
IV. THE LOUISIANA DOMA: AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE EVOLUTION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 
The liberalization of the state’s public policy on the rights of 
cohabitants and the new restrictions placed upon those rights by the 
Louisiana DOMA are at odds. Some scholars have argued that the 
policy espoused in the Louisiana DOMA marks a return to 
traditional family values through the constitutional promotion of 
marriage in the state.
133
 However, a stronger argument can be made 
that the DOMA is not only inconsistent with the trending policy 
toward cohabitants but is also an ineffective tool to promote 
marriage and an overly burdensome restriction on the rights of 
cohabitants. 
A. The Louisiana DOMA is Inconsistent with the Trend in Public 
Policy on the Rights of Cohabitants 
Until the passage of the Louisiana DOMA, there was a clear 
trend toward a more liberal policy with respect to cohabitants in 
Louisiana.
134
 This trend accurately reflects society and everyday life 
in Louisiana: more people are choosing not to marry, and more 
people have begun to think of cohabitation as an acceptable way of 
life.
135
 Both the legislation and jurisprudence in Louisiana have 
                                                                                                             
 130. Act No. 638, § 3, 1975 La. Acts 1395 (emphasis added). 
 131. Mills, supra note 18, at 1213. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 17, at 771. 
 134. See generally Mills, supra note 18; Lorio, supra note 11; see also text 
accompanying notes 102–145. 
 135. See Gallanis, supra note 1, at 58; Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, 
Cohabitation, Marriage and Union Stability: Preliminary Findings from NSFH2 7 
at tbl. 2 (Nat’l Survey of Families and Households, Working Paper No. 65, May 
1995). 
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evolved to a point where at least one commenter notes the “trend 
away from imposing upon individuals, through assertions of public 
policy, a sense of morality that is not shared by all.”136 Yet the 
Louisiana DOMA may directly contradict this trend by placing a 
blanket constitutional restriction upon the rights of cohabitants.
137
 
This restriction, the effects of which remain uncertain, is a harbinger 
of a possible return to imposing a non-universal morality upon 
cohabitants. The language of the Louisiana DOMA restricting the 
rights of cohabitants is therefore inconsistent with the evolution of 
both the law and society in the state. Furthermore, the DOMA is an 
inaccurate reflection of the contemporary public policy toward 
cohabitants. 
B. The Louisiana DOMA is an Ineffective Tool to Promote Marriage 
The primary purpose of the Louisiana DOMA is to strengthen 
the ban on same-sex marriage in Louisiana. Yet its drafters decided 
to expand the statute’s scope beyond that goal, enveloping both 
same- and opposite-sex couples with the language of the 
amendment. The reason for doing so is a familiar one. The 
Louisiana DOMA shows the drafters’ intent to focus on the state’s 
interest in promoting marriage. And some have claimed that the 
limitations placed on cohabitants “can be seen not so much as 
punishing them for some kind of immorality, but a withholding of 
benefits so as to encourage them toward a relationship that 
ostensibly would be more stable.”138 This approach mirrors the one 
courts used when applying article 1481 prior to its repeal.
139
 That 
approach is problematic because promoting marriage by 
discouraging cohabitation has not had the desired effect.
140
 With 
cohabitation becoming a more acceptable cultural practice, it is hard 
to see how any intended effect would be achieved through the 
Louisiana DOMA and its similar approach to promoting marriage. 
 
 
C. The Louisiana DOMA is too Procedurally Burdensome 
Unlike Louisiana Civil Code article 1481 or Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:79.1 (criminalizing common law marriage), the 
                                                                                                             
 136. Mills, supra note 18, at 1208. 
 137. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15. 
 138. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 17, at 771. 
 139. See Mills, supra note 18, at 1216–17.  
 140. Lorio, supra note 11, at 23. 
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Louisiana DOMA is a constitutional amendment, which makes it a 
far more permanent and stable statement of law and policy. This is 
an overly burdensome method to declare a shift in public policy 
toward cohabitants. Civil Code articles and revised statutes require 
only the work of the legislature to change them, providing for a 
more streamlined system that is better able to accurately reflect 
contemporary social views.
141
 A constitutional amendment is 
intended to reflect bedrock principles of state law, and the process 
required to change the constitution is complex and difficult.
142
 In 
order to pass a bill changing the Civil Code or the Revised 
Statutes, a majority vote of both legislative houses is required.
143
 In 
order to amend the Louisiana Constitution, a two-thirds vote of 
both houses is required to bring the amendment to a vote by the 
general electorate.
144
 A majority vote of the electorate is then 
required to adopt the amendment.
145
 The difference in the number 
of legislative bills passed compared to the number of constitutional 
amendments adopted each year reflects the differences in 
procedure and, ultimately, that constitutional principles hold a 
more permanent spot in state law.
146
 
Furthermore, the Louisiana DOMA incorporates a blanket 
restriction upon the rights of cohabitants into the “fundamental law 
upon which the structure of [Louisiana] government is 
founded.”147 An attempt by a court to rule contrary to the 
principles laid down in the Louisiana DOMA would pierce directly 
to “the very heart of the stability of constitutional government.”148 
Given the drastic changes in state policy toward cohabitants that 
have occurred throughout the history of Louisiana, the reason for 
creating such a permanent, inconsistent policy toward the rights of 
cohabitants is dubious. The proper place to create such a policy, if 
one exists at all, is through legislation, which more accurately 
reflects current trends in state law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
                                                                                                             
 141. LA. CONST. art. III, § 15. 
 142. See LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. 
 143. LA. CONST. art. III, § 15. 
 144. LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. 
 145. LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. 
 146. In 2010 alone, 12 constitutional amendments were proposed in Louisiana 
(ten of which passed) as compared to hundreds of legislative bills. See Voters 
Approve Majority of Constitutional Measures, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 2, 2010. 
 147. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 176 So. 2d 425, 
447 (La. 1965) (Summers, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. 
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If the Louisiana DOMA is necessary, it should focus upon 
strengthening the state’s ban on same-sex marriage. Venturing 
beyond that purpose and restricting the rights of opposite-sex 
couples is at odds with the public policy toward cohabitants in 
Louisiana. The amendment should therefore be changed to eliminate 
any reference to opposite-sex couples, and should instead focus 
solely on the prohibition of same-sex marriage or a legal status 
similar to marriage for persons of the same sex. Issues surrounding 
the state’s ban on same-sex marriage are outside the scope of this 
Comment, except to note the ban has been a legal constant in 
Louisiana and the public policy behind it has not yet wavered. The 
argument over whether prohibitions like this one should be placed in 
a constitution is a passionate one. And it is rooted in the debate over 
whether the right to same-sex marriage is provided for in the U.S. 
Constitution. What is not debatable, however, is that Louisiana’s 
policy toward cohabitants has changed drastically over time. 
Louisiana is a unique state because of its signature blend of 
history, culture, and people. Its civil law tradition sets it apart as 
well. Uniqueness, however, does not warrant laws that are held 
years behind the development of society. People across the country 
and in Louisiana respect a couple’s choice to stay together without 
marrying. Allowing the law to reflect this respect is the proper 
course. 
 
Randy J. Marse, Jr.
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